Speci cation frameworks such as B and Z provide power sets and cartesian products as built-in type constructors, and employ a rich notation for de ning (among other things) abstract data types using formulae of predicate logic and lambda-notation. In contrast, the so-called algebraic speci cation frameworks often limit the type structure to sort constants and rst-order functionalities, and restrict formulae to (conditional) equations. Here, we propose an intermediate framework where algebraic speci cations are enriched with a set-theoretic type structure, but formulae remain in the logic of equational Horn clauses. This combines an expressive yet modest speci cation notation with simple semantics and tractable proof theory.
Introduction
As is well known, there are two main schools of thought regarding the formal speci cation of abstract data types: the model-oriented 1, 18, 3] , and the property-oriented 5, 20] . Let us brie y recall the main features of these two approaches.
Model-oriented speci cations. The emphasis is on specifying data types as set-theoretic structures (products, power sets, etc.), the operations of the data types then being de ned as particular functions on these structures. For example, to specify a simple abstract data type of sequences, one de nes the type as a set of functions, represents a sequence hx 1 ; : : :; x n i by the function mapping i to x i for each i 2 f1; : : :; ng, and de nes concatenation using function This work was partially supported by Compass (Esprit Basic Research Working Group 6112).
y Centre for Basic Research in Computer Science 1 abstraction and application. The underlying logic for reasoning about such a speci cation is a powerful higher-order logic, e.g., based on ZF set theory.
Property-oriented speci cations. Here one generally tries to avoid choosing an explicit representation: types are left abstract as so-called sorts| sometimes equipped with a subsort inclusion relation, but otherwise unstructured. The operations are speci ed by axioms that relate them to each other, often including the main intended algebraic properties. For example, sequences could be speci ed by axioms asserting that concatenation is associative, with the empty sequence as unit. The underlying logic is often a modest Horn-clause fragment of equational rst-order logic|supplemented by an induction rule when dealing with initial algebra semantics rather than loose semantics.
Combinations. In practice, some model-oriented speci cation languages (such as Z) do allow types to be left abstract (or`given'), with the operations on them speci ed by axioms. Moreover, the use of auxiliary (`hidden') sorts and operations in property-oriented speci cations can give these a model-oriented avour.
There are also some wide-spectrum languages (e.g., RSL, Spectrum) which encompass both approaches, allowing model-and property-oriented speci cations to be mixed together. It seems to us that both the model-and property-oriented approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. In particular, we regard the restriction to Horn-clause logic in the latter as bene cial, since not only are the consequences of a speci cation much more obvious than in full higher-order logic, but also automated reasoning and prototyping are feasible. The restriction of types to unstructured sorts in property-oriented speci cations, however, we regard as a de nite disadvantage.
This has led us to investigate an intermediate or hybrid approach, combining the better features of the model-and property-oriented approaches:
Types include abstract types (of individuals) as well as product, power set, and function types.
Operations may be higher-order and partial. The only built-in relations are equality, set membership and the existential predicate (the latter merely abbreviates an equality). Formulae are restricted to Horn-clauses (no disjunction, no explicit negation, variables are universally quanti ed). Models have quite straightforward set-theoretic foundations. Speci cations have initial models (when consistent). Speci cations are amenable to prototyping and reasoning using rewriting and saturation techniques.
We hope that the illustrations given in Section 2 will convince the reader that this framework is rather expressive, at least for specifying abstract data types. The foundations laid in Section 3 are reasonably simple, and Section 4 demonstrates the tractability of the logic. Finally, Section 5 concludes by comparing the proposed framework with related approaches. This paper is an extended version of 7] . We present proofs of the results, and improve some technical details in the de nitions.
Illustrations of Speci cations
Before we take a closer look at the foundations of our proposed framework, let us illustrate its expressiveness, which approaches that of model-oriented frameworks such as B and Z, and far exceeds that of conventional algebraic speci cations. The examples given correspond to fragments of the standard Mathematical Toolkit for Z: abstract data types of numbers and sequences.
We have chosen to format our speci cations in the style normally used for Z in the literature, because the symbols here mostly have roughly the same intended interpretation as that indicated in the Z standard. However, one should bear in mind that our speci cations are not actually in Z itself, and the formal details of interpretations here are di erent. Moreover, we want the possibility of initial algebra semantics for our speci cations. For those readers not familiar with Z, a few extra words of explanation of the examples will be given below. All constants used in the axioms in the lower part of the speci cation are declared, with their types, in the upper part. The type Iis that of all individuals, and P forms the type of sets with elements from its argument type, thus N is speci ed to be a set of individuals. Sets may be used to indicate types in declarations: since N : P(I) is a set of individuals, 0 : N declares the type of 0 to be I. Moreover, for any constant c declared to have type T , there is an implicit axiom c 2 T , where the type T is now interpreted as a set.
The remaining constants declared above are all rst-order: succ has the type of a partial function on N, and and < are typed as binary relations. (We could have declared succ to have total function type N ! N, giving a slightly stronger theory, but we prefer to keep this example minimal to facilitate the discussion of its operationalization in Section 4.)
The axioms above consist of two unconditional and two conditional Hornclauses|we leave their conjunction implicit. The universal quanti cation of the variables used in the clauses is given explicitly, so that all notation used has been declared, and to avoid the need for type inference.
Our next example is a generic data type of sequences. X is a type variable, determining the type of elements in the sequences, and the constants declared have polymorphic types: they may be used with X instantiated by any ground (monomorphic) type, e.g., I I. The reference to the NaturalNumbers speci cation makes the notation declared there available locally, for use in the speci cation of the length operation. The constant seq is supposed to denote a function that maps any subset S of X to the set seq(S) of sequences whose elements are all in S.
The type speci ed for a illustrates the use of product types when specifying operations of more than one argument. Note also that we use the place-holder symbol`' to indicate where the arguments go when an operation is applied: we allow not only ordinary pre x notation, but also in x, post x, out x, and general mix x notation for applications. The place-holder may be omitted in pre x symbols.
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In this example we have to be a bit careful about existence: equations are interpreted as`existential', so x = y asserts the existence of both x and y. Since f ranges over partial functions, f (x) may not exist for some x. If f were restricted to being a total function, we could replace all the 7!'s by !'s above, and drop the existence conditions from the axioms altogether.
Foundations
Here we provide the formal foundations for our speci cation language. For perspicuity, we treat rst a simpler kernel language, giving syntax, semantics, proof rules, and various results; in particular, we show how to decide whether a term is well-typed, as soon as each constant and variable has a type. Models for speci cations in the kernel language are de ned in a set theoretic framework. Sound proof rules are given for this class of models, which has an initial model. The construction of this initial model is a key point to prove completeness of deduction, more precisely that any atomic formula valid in all models is deducible with these proof rules. At the end of this section we de ne the syntax of our complete language, and indicate how it can be reduced to the kernel language. First, we make some general remarks about the novel aspects of our work. Compared to conventional algebraic speci cation languages, the type system of our language is very rich, being close to that of Z. We follow Z in interpreting types as sets, and in allowing them to be used as values in terms too. However, we take a slightly intensional view of sets: two sets that have the same values as members are not necessarily equal! This is achieved by what amounts to a labelling of sets, provided by a choice function (denoted by choose) which gives a unique element for any set given as argument. This provides the key to the completeness of our logic.
The motivation for not using extensional equality on sets is twofold. First, an axiom in a speci cation could have an equality between sets as a condition. If two di erently-speci ed sets (say, subsets of the natural numbers) happened to have the same members, unexpected consequences might follow. By insisting that two sets are only regarded as equal when this follows by algebraic reasoning, rather than by membership equivalence, we remove this (admittedly minor) danger. Second, for tractability and operationalization of reasoning, we wish to remain in Horn-clause logic (with equality), and it is well-kown that extensionality cannot be axiomatized in ( nitary) Horn-clause logic. Adding a choice function, freely interpreted, allows formulating a deduction rule for an extensional equality on sets with non-standard elements. Our treatment of higher-order operations is similarly intensional: two operations do not get equated just because they give the same results on the same arguments. We claim that this kind of intensional equality of sets and functions is necessary to keep our framework truly`algebraic'. Other frameworks for higher-order algebraic speci cation, e.g., that of 11], provide extensionality and term-models, but the proof theory seems less tractable.
For expressing types, we propose, in addition to the constant Ifor the builtin type of individuals 1 and variables, several type constructors: partial power set operator Pand cartesian product , and partial function space constructor 7! and relation space constructor $. Furthermore, we introduce the termgenerated subset constructor T that extracts from any set its term-generated part; this is needed by our choice to consider also non-standard (i.e. non termgenerated) models. Finally, for technical reasons, we include in our type system a universal type U.
In Z, the function space S 7! T and relation space S $ T are both interpreted as subtypes of P(S T ). This may seem rather natural, but it has some unfortunate pragmatic consequences in connection with overloading and subtype polymorphism: specifying f : S 7! T restricts the graph of f to be a subset of Here, in contrast to Z, our interpretation of S 7! T is as a set of partial functions which always (when de ned) give results in T when applied to arguments in S! Thus specifying f : S 7! T does not say anything at all about what might result when f is applied to arguments outside S. An axiom f 2 S 7! T here corresponds to S C f 2 S 7! T in Z, where S C f denotes the restriction of f to domain S (but our type assertion f : S 7! T appears to have no exact counterpart in Z). Similarly, we interpret S $ T as a set of binary relations that may relate other pairs than those in S T . By this means, we are able to avoid a signi cant danger of accidental inconsistency in speci cations, and permit the use of subtype polymorphism and overloading, as common in some algebraic speci cation frameworks. Notice that our change of interpretation does not prevent type-checking: f (s) is only considered type-correct when f : S 7! T and s : S hold for some S and T . 1 For simplicity in this paper, we do not consider further`given' types of individuals. 6 
Syntax
A presentation P in our kernel language consists of a set of declarations of typed constants (including I;P; T, choose, ; 7!; $) and variables, together with a set of Horn-clauses built from terms over the declared items using three built-in predicates: equality =, membership 2 and existence #. The where the`... 's indicate declared constants and variables. Place-holders`' in constant symbols indicate that these are to denote functions, and that applications are to be written concretely with the argument(s) in the position of the place-holder(s). Parentheses are allowed for disambiguating the grouping. Thus the application of P to I may be written PI or P(I), and that of to (I; I) as I I. The syntax for pairs TERM ; TERM and applications of product TERM TERM is assumed to be left-associative. Note that a list of ATOMS may be empty. Types are denoted by type terms generated by the following grammar:
TYPE ::= VAR j I j U j TYPE TYPE j P(TYPE) j TYPE 7! TYPE j TYPE $ TYPE RTYPE ::= T(VAR) j T(I) j T(U) j T(TYPE TYPE) STYPE ::= T(P(TYPE)) j T(TYPE 7! TYPE) j T(TYPE $ TYPE) TTYPE ::= RTYPE j STYPE Type terms will be interpreted as sets of values (when de ned), with variables VAR indicating polymorphism. We shall regard TYPE, RTYPE, STYPE, and TTYPE as kinds, writing T : K to assert that T is a well-formed type term of kind K . Intuitively, values of types in TTYPE are generated by`standard' terms, excluding the use of choose; the types in STYPE are simply those that are interpreted as sets of sets, so that choose may be used on their elements.
For example, the types I P(I), P(I) 7! P(I) and P(P(I)) are of kind TYPE and T(I P(I) P(P(I))) is of kind TTYPE.
Type terms are partially ordered by a subtype inclusion ordering . The cartesian product constructor is monotone in both arguments, as are P and T in their only argument. The function space constructor is anti-monotone in the rst argument and monotone in the second. The relation space constructor is anti-monotone in both arguments, just as if it were a boolean function. So the subtype inclusion ordering on type terms satis es the following assertions, 7 where S, T , V , W range over well-formed type terms of kind TYPE only:
together with re exivity and transitivity of . Note that the omission of the inclusions S 7! T S $ T P(S T ) is deliberate, to allow overloading, as discussed at the start of Section 3. The inclusion V 7! W P(U U) re ects the fact that a partial function (graph) is a set of pairs, without restriction on the components of the pairs; similarly for binary relations in V $ W P(U U). Proposition 3.1 The validity of formulae 9 : : : 8 : : :(S 1 T 1^: : :^S n T n ) where S i ; T i for i 2 f1; : : :; ng are of kind TYPE or TTYPE, is decidable. Proof: Given a type inclusion problem of the form 9 8(S 1 T 1^: : :^S n T n ), we start with the replacement of universally quanti ed type variables by new constants of the same type. Let the so obtained purely existentially quanti ed problem C be 9(S 0 1 T 0 1^: : :^S 0 n T 0 n ). The conjunction is then rewritten using the following set of rewrite rules, closely corresponding to subtyping assertions above, and taking into account in the last additional rule that an inequation with the Toperator, that can only occur at the top of type terms, can be weakened. 
Observe that in general, constants are declared to have types of kind TTYPE, the exception being choose.
Proposition 3.2 Assuming that the declarations in a presentation provide types
for each constant and variable used, it is decidable to check that each term is well-typed.
Proof: From constant and variable types, it is possible to determine in a bottomup process a type for any term built from these constants and variables with the pairing and function application operators. Because of subtyping and overloading, a term may have several types. In order to type f (a) knowing a : A and f : F , we solve 9 S; T (F T(S 7! T )^A T(S)): Let be a solution. Then f (a) : T( (T)).
In order to type (a 1 ; a 2 ) knowing a 1 : A 1 and a 2 : A 2 , we solve 9 S; T (A 1 T(S)^A 2 T(T)): Let be a solution. Then (a 1 ; a 2 ) : T( (S) (T)). 2 For example, if N : T(P(I)), then we can form the term P(N), which is of type T(P(P(I))) since P : T(P(X ) 7! P(P(X ))) and the system 9 S; T (T(P(X ) 7! P(P(X ))) T(S 7! T )^T(P(I)) T(S)) has a solution with X = I, S = P(I)) and T = P(P(I)).
In the following sections, for an arbitrary presentation P, we write F; X for the declared type constructors and variables (with their respective kinds), F; X for the remaining constants and variables (with their respective types), for (F; F; X), and for without the constant choose (which plays a special role in our framework). A -presentation is given by a signature ( ; X) and a set of ( ; X)-Horn-clauses. In the following, ( ; X)-terms are called standard terms and ( ; X)-terms are called non-standard terms.
Semantics
The semantics for our formulae are structural set theoretic models. We therefore start with the de nition of an interpretation for the type constructors (from F) and other constants (from F). These interpretations are not given separately, since both can be used in terms. Remark that we use a classical notion of set in the de nition, as e.g. in 19] .
Note furthermore that typing and membership are not to be confused: except for declared constants, deriving t : T does not imply that t 2 T holds. This di erence comes from the use of partial functions. E.g., div(1; 0) may be of type I, but may fail to exist, i.e. div(1; 0) does not denote a member of the set I. De nition 3.3 A standard set-theoretic -interpretation I is a pair (U I ; : I ) of a universe U I and an interpretation function : I , such that: U I is a set of atomic objects (individuals and pairs) and sets (the special constant U is not interpreted as an element of U I , to avoid foundational problems|conceptually, it may be interpreted as the entire universe U I );
I I is a set of individuals; P I is a partial function such that P I (S), when de ned, is a subset of the ordinary powerset of S; I is a partial function yielding, when de ned, the cartesian product of its arguments; 7! I is a partial function yielding, when de ned, a set of (graphs of) partial functions such that when g 2 S 7! I T then (s; t) 2 g and s 2 S imply t 2 T ; $ I is a partial function yielding, when de ned, a set of (graphs of) binary relations; ( ; ) I is a partial function yielding, when de ned, the pair of its arguments; 10 f (s) I is t when f is a function graph and (s; t) 2 f ; for all constants c in F F (other than U, T and choose), c I 2 I (T) Note that T I is left unrestricted above. Now we relax the notion of interpretation to allow non-standard elements (i.e. not denoted by a -term) that represent (but are not themselves) sets. These non-standard elements may be regarded as labels' that distinguish between sets which include the same standard elements.
De nition 3.4 A (non-standard) -interpretation I is a standard set-theoretic -interpretation with the following di erences:
The sets in P I (S) may include non-standard elements that represent (but are not themselves) subsets of S;
T I is a partial function such that, when de ned, T I (S) is the -termgenerated subset of S (excluding all non-standard elements); choose I is a partial function which gives a unique arbitrary element from any non-empty set S 2 U I , and is otherwise unde ned. A -interpretation where I I is a set of -terms is called a -term interpretation.
Let us illustrate De nition 3.4 with an example.
Example 3.5 Let F = fs; 0; g with 0 : I, s : I 7! I, : I $ I. Let furthermore Nat and Even be of type P(I). Then I de ned as follows is a -interpretation: U I is a set containing all natural numbers, the set of even natural numbers, the set of all natural numbers, the graph of the successor function, the graph of the less or equal relation, and all pairs of natural numbers.
Moreover, U I has to contain the denotations of all the built-in constants (other than U), i.e., I, P, , 7!, $, T, and choose. I I is the set of natural numbers, P I maps I I to fNat I ; Even I g and is unde ned for all other arguments.
I is the empty partial function graph;
7! I maps (I I ; I I ) to the singleton containing the graph of the successor function only; it is unde ned for all other arguments.
$ I maps (I I ; I I ) to the singleton containing the graph of the less or equal relation; it is unde ned for all other arguments.
( ) I is de ned as required for -interpretations.
( ; ) I maps any two natural numbers to their pair, and is otherwise undened; 0 I is zero, s I is the (graph of the) successor function on natural numbers, I is less or equal on natural numbers, Nat I is the set of natural numbers and Even I is the set of even natural numbers.
T I is the identity on I I , P I (I I ), I I 7! I I I , and I I $ I I I ; and all their cartesian products built with ; it is unde ned otherwise. The choice function choose I gives 2 zero for Even I , one for Nat I (and hence for I I ), the graph of the successor function for (I 7! I) I and the less or equal relation for (I$ I) I . Hence, we get for example, 0 I 2 I I , Nat I 2 P I (I I )); Even I 2 P I (I I )), and s(0) I = one as expected. Remark that T(P(I)) I is the set containing only the set of natural numbers and the set of even natural numbers but not the set of odd natural numbers.
However, since we also consider non-standard interpretations, any interpretation J de ned as I , except that I J is the set of (positive and negative) integers, is another -interpretation. for all (F; ?)-terms T ; T 0 of kind TYPE, for all t 2 2 T(T) I and for all t 1 2 T(T 7! T 0 ) I , h(t 1 (t 2 ) I ) = h(t 1 )(h(t 2 )) J whenever t 1 (t 2 ) exists. De nition 3.7 A (X X; I )-variable assignment is a mapping from variables in X X to (F; ?)-type terms and elements of I I respectively, such that j X is a (X; I )-variable assignment and (x) 2 ( (T)) I if x : T , where T is a (F; X)-type term. The assignment is extended to a partial function I mapping terms (possibly containing variables) to their interpretations.
-substitutions are de ned as usual as (X X; I )-variable-assignments in -term interpretations I , such that fx 2 X X j (x) 6 = xg is nite. The set fx 2 X X j (x) 6 = xg is then called the domain of , written Dom( ). The set of -substitutions with domain included in X is written SUBST (X X). Formula satisfaction is written I j = , or P j = in case all models of P satisfy the formula . P is consistent if it has a model.
Proof Rules
From this section on, we restrict the possible sets of formulas, such that some atoms, trivially unsatis able due to type mismatches, are eliminated.
De nition 3.9 A standard -presentation is a -presentation P, where:
All non-variable terms occurring in P belong to a type of kind TTYPE. If a constant c (other than U) is declared to be of type T , then c 2 T is a fact in P. choose does not occur in the conclusion of any clause in P. All variables of type T with T : TYPE in P occur only as the left-hand-side of a membership relation`2'.
All equalities s = t satisfy that the sets of types of (s) and (t) are the same for every -substitution .
All membership formulas s 2 t satisfy that (t) is of type T(S 7! T ), T(S $ T ) or T(P(S T )), if (s) is of type S T , and of type T(P(T))
if (s) is of any other type, for every -substitution . The proof rules shown in Table 1 are for a deduction relation`taking two arguments. The rst argument is a standard -presentation. The second argument is a -formula . These rules are divided into four groups: the upper one is for the embedding of typing into set theory, and uses the subtype inclusion de ned in Section 3.1. Then there are rules handling function and relation graphs. Note that z is here intended to be of type U 7! U, which is a subtype of P(U U). These are followed by general set theoretic rules, which correspond to the axiom of choice and the axiom of (non-standard) extensionality. Last but not least, there are the logic inference rules; the meta-variables G, G 0 range over possibly-empty conjunctions of atomic formulae, and L, L 0 may be a single atomic formula or empty.
One of the inference rules (SubstConform) uses P-conform -substitutions.
These are de ned as follows:
De nition 3.10 Let 2 SUBST (X X) and P be a -presentation. Then is P-conform if for any variable x in Dom( ) \ X, P` (x) #. The set of all P-conform substitutions is denoted by P-SUBST (X X).
P-conform substitutions have the nice property that they behave likesubstitutions for composition with general variable assignments.
Results
We rst address correctness of the deduction rules.
Theorem 3.11 Let P be a standard -presentation. Then, all deduction rules in PL are sound, i.e. if P` then P j = .
Proof: We have to check that each rule is sound in any -interpretation which is a model of P. SubType: if t 2 S holds in a -interpretation I , for any assignment , I (t) 2 I (S). Then if S T , I (S) I (T) (since when both t 2 S and T # hold, neither S nor T can involve Uat all, hence either S = T or S = T(T)). So it is sound to deduce that I (t) 2 I (T) for any assignment , thus t 2 T holds in the -interpretation I , PairType1, PairType2, AppTyp, FApply, FGraph, RApply, RGraph: these axioms are valid in any -interpretation by construction.
SubSet; Choice are sound due to the interpretation of Pas a partial power set function and of choose as a choice function (de ned on all non-empty sets) in every -interpretation. Lemma 3.12 Let be a signature, P a presentation, I a -interpretation, G a conjunction of ( ; X)-atoms, 2 P-SUBST (X) and be a variable assignment for X X in I . Then (G) holds in I under i G holds in I under . Proof: Let us rst prove that if 2 P-SUBST (X) and is a variable assignment for X X in I , (x) is also a variable assignment of X X in I . This amounts to prove that for all x 2 X with x : T , (x) 2 (T) I . If x 6 2 Dom( ), then this is implied by being a (X X; I )-variable assignment. Otherwise, we know that ( (x)) 2 T(U I ), since P j = (x) #. Moreover (x) 2 (T) by de nition of a substitution as a special variable assignment in a term interpretation. Hence, ( (x)) 2 ( (T)) I . Then let us denote I ; j = (G) the statement (G) holds in I under . De nition 3.13 Let P be a standard -interpretation and V X X. We de ne I P (V ) to be the -interpretation I whose universe U I is the set of all t] where t is a ( ; V )-term with P`t #, and where :] is de ned as follows : 8 t with Var(t) V , such that t : T where T : RTYPE or T : TYPE, t] is a representative of fu j u : T ; Var(u) V and P`u = tg if P`t #; 8 t with Var(t) V , such that t : T with T : STYPE, t] = f u] j u : U ; Var(u) V and P`u 2 tg f choose(t)]g if P`t #, where U is S when T is T(P(S)), and R S when T is T(R 7! S) or T(R $ One may check that this de nition is a -interpretation in the sense of Definitions 3.3 and 3.4.
The di culty in the initiality proof is hidden in the extensionality of sets. The following lemma is crucial for the interpretation of equality and membership. , there exists w such that P`w = s and P`w = t. So P`s = t.
2. Assume that P`t # and P`s #. s] is a representative of fu j u : S; Var(u) V and P`u = sg, T is of the form T(P(S)), T(R 7! S), or T(R $ S), and t] = f w] j w : W ; Var(w) V and P`w 2 tg. W is S when T is T(P(S)), and R S in the other two cases. Now, we can prove that our candidate for an initial model is actually a model in our logics.
Theorem 3.15 Let P be a consistent standard -presentation and V X X. Then I P (V ) is a model of P. Proof: Let I stand for I P (V ) in the following.
Lemma 3.14 guarantees that the relations 2 and = are interpreted correctly. Remark that Paramodulation and PartialRe ex guarantee that the relation = is a congruence. The satisfaction of existential formulas`t #' follows from the de nition of the interpretation: by construction of I , t]
is de ned if and only if t #. In order to prove that I is a model of P, we prove that all clauses in P are valid in I . Suppose G ) L is in P and is a (I ; X X)-variable assignment, such that I j = (G). Let us de ne the -substitution 0 , such that 0 (x)] = (x) for all x 2 X X, i.e. I j = 0 (G) by Lemma 3.12 (use 0 as and de ned by (x) = x] for all x 2 X). So I j = 0 (A) for any atom A in the conjuction of atoms G. By de nition of I and Lemma 3.14 P` 0 (A) and so P` 0 (G). Then we can use the SubstConform rule on G ) L, followed immediately by k times Cut (where k is the number of atoms in G), in order to get P` 0 (L). Hence, I j = (L) by de nition of I . 2 There remains to show completeness of deduction and initiality. Both proofs are in fact similar to those for G n -logics 6]. 
Unicity of the homomorphismh from I to J is proved as usual by structural induction on t. 2 
Pragmatics
The following extension to the grammar given in Section 3.1 covers the entire speci cation language used in the illustrations in Section 2: SPEC ::= NAME DECLS CLAUSE j NAME VARS] DECLS CLAUSE DECLS ::= DECL j DECL; DECLS DECL ::= NAME j CONST : TERM CLAUSE ::= : : : j ATOMS ) CLAUSE j CLAUSE^CLAUSE j ATOMS , ATOMS j ATOMS j 8 VARS : TYPE CLAUSE CONST ::= : : : j ! VARS ::= VAR j VAR; VARS TYPE ::= TERM
The main points to note in the transformation from the above into the kernel language de ned in Section 3.1 are these: a name used in a declaration is replaced by the declarations to which it refers, the associated variables and clauses being incorporated too; set-valued terms used as types in declarations have to be replaced by their element types (cf. Z); the same holds for types of quanti ed variables in clauses; each constant declaration c : T generates a clause c 2 T ; each quanti ed variable declaration x : T generates an atom x 2 T in the premiss of the clause where x occurs; declarations of total functions f : S ! T generate f : S 7! T and a clause s 2 S ) f (s) 2 T ; and clauses have to be converted to Horn form.
Illustrations of Proofs
Compared to Z speci cations, our framework has some restrictions: we do not allow arbitrary quanti cations, nor explicit negation. However this is a deliberate decision, since restricting our presentations to Horn clauses with equalities and membership atoms gives three great advantages:
The operational semantics of our presentations is given by conditional rewriting. Our speci cations are actually programs executable with an interpretor of rewrite rules. We claim that we can provide an automatic tool for building a conditional term rewriting system equivalent to a given presentation using a saturation technique.
We also think possible to obtain with the same technique, a refutationally complete procedure for proving a theorem in the initial model of a presentation. This proof procedure uses an ordering on terms and atoms to apply inference rules only on maximal literals in the clauses, which reduces the search space. Using the saturation procedure or the refutational theorem prover we have in mind, requires to be in equational Horn clause logic. So the rst step is to establish a correspondance between deduction with rules in PL written P` , and deduction in Horn clause logic written P`H CL .
Let us replace SubType, Choice and Ext by Horn clause axioms and consider the set HA of Horn axioms described in Table 2 . Now deduction rules WellDef, PartialRe ex, Axioms, SubstConform, Cut and Paramodulation are deduction rules for partial Horn deduction. A little more work must be done for eliminating WellDef, PartialRe ex, that requires to transform atoms t # into t 2 U(see 6] ). Eventually every predicate di erent from equality has to be turned into a boolean function. Let us call these two transformations. Then one can prove as in 6] that for any ground atom L, P`L if and only if (P HA)`H CL (L) .
However, for a better readability, in the examples below, we do not perform the transformation .
Let us now brie y recall the saturation procedure as described for instance in 2, 16] . The three main inference rules are superposition into conclusion, superposition into premisses and equality resolution. Subsumption by another clause and eliminationof tautologies are also used to eliminate redundant clauses. An ordered strategy is used for reducing the search space by using only maximal terms and literals w.r.t. a given ordering for inference computation. A saturation process is a sequence of presentations (P 0 ; P 1 ; : : :), also called a derivation, where P i is deduced from P i?1 by application of one inference rule. This derivation must be fair in the intuitive sense that no clause is forgotten in the process of generating consequences. P 0 is consistent if and only if the empty clause does not belong to any P i . Moreover if P 1 is the set of persisting clauses in this fair derivation and does not contain the empty clause, then one can construct from P 1 a conditional term rewriting system which is terminating and con uent in the initial model of P 0 . This indeed provides a way to compute in a nite and unambiguous way the normal form of any expression in P 0 . The complete description of the process and its proof can be found in 6].
For understanding the proof tools proposed below, we rst show the transformation of the initial Z-style speci cation NaturalNumbers given in Section 2 into a presentation in our logic, according to Section 3.5. Note that specifying succ to be a total function would amount to adding to the following presentation the clause: x 2 N ) succ(x) 2 N. Considering this last set of clauses, with an adequate ordering on terms and formulas, and an ordered strategy, there is no possible superposition into the conclusions, neither into premises, so the presentation is saturated, hence consistent. The ordering may be built with a lexicographic path ordering (see for instance 4]) from a precedence including ; <; succ N. To order formulas, we may ignore the membership and equality relations, map atoms and terms to multisets of sequences, and compare sequences with the multiset extension of the lexicographic extension of . For instance to compare the two atomic formulas x y and x 2 N, we compare f( ; x; y)g and f(N; x)g. Since N, we get ( ; x; y) lex (N; x), f( ; x; y)g mult lex f(N; x)g, and thus x y greater than x 2 N. It may be worth emphasising that with this saturation technique, we can handle a limited form of negative assertion. Assume for example that we want to state in our presentation that 8 x 2 N :(x = succ(x)). The negative clause (x 2 N)^(x = succ(x)) ) is added to the presentation and superpositions are performed. With an ordered strategy, the saturation process terminates and proves the consistency of the whole presentation. Here to compare the two atomic formulas x = succ(x) and x 2 N, we compare f(x); (succ; x)g and f(N; x)g. Since succ N, we get (succ; x) lex (N; x), f(x); (succ; x)g mult lex f(N; x)g, and thus x = succ(x) greater than x = succ(x) and x 2 N.
Then we can prove by refutation 9 x 2 N :(x = succ(0)). In this case, the clause ) (x 2 N)^(x = succ(0)) is added, and superposition is performed with a renaming of (x 2 N)^(x = succ(x)) ) and generates ) (0 2 N)^(0 2 N), then the empty clause.
Taking N for X in GenericSequences, the speci cation gets transformed into the following one: NaturalSequences NaturalNumbers seq : T(P(I) 7! P(I)) h i : T(P(I)) h i : T(I 7! P(I)) a : T((P(I) P(I)) 7! P(I)) length : T(P(I) 7! I) 8 x : T(I) 8 s; t; u : T(P(I)) seq The technique extends to the higher-order example of MappingSequences in Section 2. The di culty again is to compare the terms mapseq(f )(s a t) and mapseq(f )(s) a mapseq(f )(t) with a suitable ordering. This can be done also by mapping each term to a sequence and comparing them with a lexicographic path ordering. The sequence corresponding with the rst term is, e.g., (mapseq; f ; ( a ; s; t)). The sequence corresponding with the second term is ( a ; (mapseq; f ; s); (mapseq; f ; t)). Assuming mapseq a in the precedence, mapseq(f )(s a t) is greater than mapseq(f )(s) a mapseq(f )(t), and superposition can be applied only on the rst term. Then it is not di cult to see that the whole presentation is saturated, thus consistent.
However, in order to prove a theorem such as 8 f ; s length(mapseq(f )(s)) = length(s), we need an inductive theorem prover. Induction is also necessary to prove the totality of functions declared as partial, and this is certainly a domain for further investigations. This discussion leads to the conclusion that rewriting techniques o er good possibilities for (semi-)automated theorem proving in our framework. There is surely some work to adapt existing theorem provers for our logic, but the changes seem to be reasonably simple.
5 Conclusion
The framework proposed here has been largely compared to the abstract data types approach and to Z speci cations in the previous sections. But other works have strong connections too.
First of all, this work is derived from R n -/G n -logics presented in 8].
The construction of R n -/G n -logics starts with Russell's rami ed theory of types, to build a set-theoretic framework providing expressive typing, higher-order functions and initial models at the same time. The parameter n, which is a natural number, gives a bound on the nesting depth of the sets used in interpretations. The di erence from Russell's rami ed theory of types is the consideration of non-term-generated models. R n -logics are axiomatisable by an order-sorted equational Horn logic with a membership predicate, and G n -logics provide in addition partial functions. The framework proposed in this paper is a re nement of G n {logics with an extended type system. Kinds, not existing in G n -logics, are added, and operators , 7! and $ provide further re nements of the type structure.
The deduction rules are quite similar to those given for G n -logics. ETL 10] is in fact a fragment of R n -logics 6]. An ETL presentation is a triple ; V ; E] ], such that is a set of function symbols, V is a set of unsorted variables and E is a set of -Horn clauses using only equality \=" and the typing relation \:" as binary operators. The typing relation satis es the paramodulation axiom and therefore it can be used as a new relation symbol in our logic. Remark that we cannot reuse \2" for this purpose, since it has more properties than \:" in ETL. So it is possible to construct a presentation, such that an -atom is true in our logic if and only if it holds in ETL. Power and uni ed algebras have been proposed and compared in 15] and also greatly in uenced our framework. Concerning power algebras, the main di erence is the absence of a prede ned empty set, which corresponds to the bottom element in uni ed algebra, and of prede ned singletons. Instead we can de ne empty sets and singletons in our logic. The other operators of power algebras: inclusion, intersection and union, can be axiomatized in the same way as in uni ed algebras 15]. Hence we can encode power algebras (apart from extensional equality of sets, of course) in our framework, and come quite close to uni ed algebras. More generally this work has similarities with higher-order functional langages. Some higher-order features are provided, since function graphs are speci ed as set constants, which can be passed to other functions as higherorder arguments. During the last years, a number of papers have dealt with the extension of rst-order algebraic speci cations to higher-order ones. Among them are 9, 17, 12, 14, 13, 11]. Our approach di ers from 11] for instance in that our formal basis is set-theoretic rather than purely algebraic and provides a uniform treatment of typing and higher-order functions. Compared with -calculi, we have deliberately omitted the abstraction operator in order to minimize the functions in the initial model, which may be crucial for limiting the search space for automated theorem proving.
